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Why Rubbish Matters:
The Neoconservative Underpinnings

of Social Constructionist Theory
Steven G. Geyt
Anyone who has paid the slightest attention to legal
scholarship during the last ten years will already be familiar
with the theories patiently addressed by Daniel Farber and
Suzanna Sherry in their book Beyond All Reason.' This book is
already notorious in some circles, although non-academics will
be mystified that such a ruckus could be raised by a text that
sets for itself the modest task of defending the value of
concepts such as truth, reason, and merit. The fact that
academics will not be at all surprised by the book's infamy says
a lot about the distance the academy has traveled from society
outside the ivy-covered walls.
Farber and Sherry address a motley batch of theories that
constitute this season's academic haute couture, including
critical race theory, radical feminism, gaylegal theory, the
remnants of Critical Legal Studies, and variations on the diffuse
themes of postmodernism and deconstruction. As Farber and
Sherry note, 2 the thing that unifies these otherwise disparate
intellectual fashions is their uniform reliance on social
constructionist theory-i.e., the assertion that reality is
subjective and socially constructed-along with the corollary
notion that universalism, objectivity, reason, and merit are
harmful concepts useful mainly as methods of bolstering the
dominance of the status quo.
Farber and Sherry serve an important function in Beyond
All Reason by challenging the claims of political purity and
progressivism that usually accompany social constructionist
t John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University
College of Law.
1.

DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE

RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997).
2. See id at 4-5.
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theory. This is important, because Farber and Sherry cannot
logically be dismissed as Neanderthal right-wing opponents of
egalitarian or civil libertarian critiques of the existing order.
Rather, Farber and Sherry take care to consider social
constructionist theory on its own terms, as a body of doctrine
specifically intended to foster a more just and equitable social
order. Much of Farber and Sherry's book addresses the details
of social constructionist theory's failure to live up to its
progressive promise, and they focus particular attention on the
anti-Semitic and racist conclusions that often follow from
different aspects of social constructionist theory. This is an
important contribution to the debate over these theories, but
Farber and Sherry's consequentialist approach does not
exhaust the list of reasons why these supposedly progressive
theories are, at bottom, intrinsically conservative if not
reactionary in their approach to social and legal doctrine.
My contribution to the debate over Farber and Sherry's
book will sketch the outlines of the deeper conservatism that
lies at the core of social constructionism. I use the term
"conservatism" in the most basic sense, to denote three
characteristics that can be found in all manifestations of social
constructionist theory: the antipathy to popular rule, resistance
to social change and political evolution, and deference to
common manifestations of political authoritarianism. These
conservative characteristics are consequences of the idiosyncratic way social constructionists approach two phenomena:
truth and power.
This is the essence of social constructionism's progressive
dilemma: social constructionists deny that truth is a valid
analytic concept, and they also deny that a rational analysis of
social conditions can contribute anything meaningful to
debates about reality, other than to express the analyst's own
socially constructed personal perspective. Having dispensed
with truth and rationality, however, social constructionist
theories must substitute some other normative reference point
for human interaction and political decisionmaking. The
various different social constructionist theorists respond by
positing their own group's interests as the central defining
factor in assessing the legitimacy and desirability of existing
social, political, and legal arrangements. Thus, critical race
theorists criticize existing society as racist, feminists view
society as sexist, and so forth.
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These two precepts form the heart of social constructionist
theory: first, that truth is chimerical, and second, that power in
the form of group interests should provide the normative
for rationally derived, more universalist
substitute
assessments of political and legal legitimacy. Both of these
precepts have deeply conservative implications for social
constructionist theory. Not only do these precepts render
broad-based progressive coalitions unlikely, they also rob the
left of the intellectual tools that make any social critique
possible. Every social value is rendered equivalent to every
other social value, and policy choices are (and according to the
social constructionists, will inevitably be) based solely on the
most powerful group's self-interest. Social constructionism
effectively replaces the aspiration for truth with the quest for
power. If values are shaped by the most powerful socially
constructed group, then it is crucial that one's own group
accumulate as much power as possible. "We take these truths
to be self-evident" is replaced by "What's in it for us?" This,
then, is the odd brand of postmodern progressivism to which
Farber and Sherry respond-a selfish, solipsistic progressivism
that somehow manages to provide demagogues on both the
right and the left with a handy justification for self-righteous
tyranny.
I. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND THE
SUBSTITUTION OF "TRUTH" FOR TRUTH
Social constructionism's political problems begin with the
theory's most basic contentions that all assertions of truth are
subjective expressions of group self-interest, and that this
collective self-interest in turn defines the values of all
individuals within the group. 3 At one level, these aspects of
social constructionism are uncontroversial. At the lowest level
of abstraction, these contentions simply express the commonsense recognition that everyone's perspective reflects his or her
own experiences in life, and the equally commonplace recog3. I am assuming that the reader is familiar with the description of
social constructionist thought in the book that is the focal point of this
symposium. Therefore, to the extent that my assertions about social
constructionist thought coincide with Farber and Sherry's, I have not provided
further references beyond those cited in the book, especially id. at 3-33. I
have provided citations where my assertions about social constructionism go
beyond Farber and Sherry's, or where specific references will clarify the
discussion in the text.
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nition that these experiences are heavily influenced by other
members of each person's family and social group. At higher
levels of abstraction, however, these central axioms of social
constructionism abandon common sense and become a justification for the raw assertion of parochial, group-specific "truths"
that can be neither confirmed nor contested by anyone outside
the group. 4 Social constructionist "truths" cannot be confirmed

4. Although there are overtones of relativism throughout the social
constructionist challenge to the rationalistic concept of truth, in fact the social
constructionists do not abandon the concept of truth at all. The thrust of
social constructionist theory is not that truth does not exist, but rather that
each group has its own 'truth," which is perceived subjectively and
communicated anecdotally through stories rather than systematically through
rational critique and empirical analysis. Thus, social constructionists are just
as wedded to the importance of "truth" as those of us who are fond of the
liberal Enlightenment approach to the world.
There are, however, two differences between the liberal and social
constructionist approaches to truth. The first difference is that liberals feel
compelled to identify and articulate normative truths that have some appeal
to everyone in society, including those who are unlike themselves, whereas
the social constructionists give up on the attempt to construct any but the
most parochial and self-interested "truths." The liberal truths that are
intended to appeal to nonliberals are often no more grandiose than the weakly
universalist truth that it is safer for everyone to live in a society based on
peaceful coexistence between ideological adversaries rather than a society
that permits ideological battles to the death. But even this weak universalism
seems beyond the social constructionists, who sometimes mock the very
notion that such a premise is anything more than a surreptitious effort to win
ideological battles by default. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, LiberalismDoesn't Exist,
1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 1000 (arguing that liberalism "does not have at its center
an adjudicative mechanism that stands apart from any particular moral and
political agenda," but rather has "a very particular moral agenda (privileging
the individual over the community, the cognitive over the affective, the
abstract over the particular)").
The second difference between the Enlightenment liberal and social
constructionist attitudes toward truth is that liberals join Hannah Arendt in
asserting that political action must be limited by the realm of factual truth
defined as "those things which men cannot change at will." HANNAH ARENDT,
BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 263-64
(1954). Contrast the social constructionist attitude toward factual truth-i.e.,
as a malleable political construct defined entirely by the subjective
perspective of interested groups-with Arendt's defense of "stubborn" truth
against politics:
That facts are not secure in the hands of power is obvious, but the
point here is that power, by its very nature, can never produce a
substitute for the secure stability of factual reality, which, because it
is past, has grown into a dimension beyond our reach. Facts reassert
themselves by being stubborn, and their fragility is oddly combined
with great resiliency-the same irreversibility that is the hallmark of
all human action. In their stubbornness, facts are superior to power;
they are less transitory than power formations, which arise when

1999]

WHYRUBBISH MATTERS

1711

because they are premised on the assumption that empirical
methods of analysis are incurably corrupted by the status quo,5
a stance that conveniently robs critics of the ability to point out
that some social constructionist verities are contradicted by the
unmediated facts of the world around them. At the same time,
social constructionist "truths" cannot be contested because
social constructionists posit that all attempts to dispute the
facts or logic that lie behind social constructionist assertions
are tainted by a self-interested power structure. Thus, criticism of social constructionism is by definition invalid. Someone
who criticizes social constructionism is simply dismissed as a
badly constructed critic.
The social constructionists assert that efforts to justify
existing social structures by reference to rational and objective
standards are inherently biased. As with all aspects of social
constructionism, this claim contains a kernel of truth. No
argument or observation will ever be entirely rational,
objective, or untainted by the observer's bias. Even the most
broad-minded social critic cannot completely escape the
perspective-warping burdens imposed by the critic's own
position in the world. But the very concepts of rationality and
objectivity express the aspiration (admittedly often unrealized)
that all things are subject to question and all claims of truth
are tentative and subject to review if the facts warrant. The
aspiration to rationality and objectivity also expresses the
humbling recognition that reality has some external existence
outside the narrow confines of a particular observer's
consciousness, which at least should make the observer
hesitate before rejecting the conflicting observations inherent
in other observers' perspectives.
The key aspect of the aspiration to rationality and
objectivity, and the thing that makes liberal Enlightenment
approaches conducive to producing progressive political
results, is that rationalist critics who apply their critical
framework consistently must apply that framework most

men get together for a purpose but disappear as soon as the purpose
is either achieved or lost. This transitory character makes power a
highly unreliable instrument for achieving permanence of any kind,
and, therefore, not only truth and facts are insecure in its hands but
untruth and non-facts as well.
Id. at 258-59.
5. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 28 (discussing social
constructionist hostility to empirical analysis).
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rigorously to the critics' own beliefs and assumptions. In
contrast, the social constructionist premise that all subjective
perceptions are "true" in the sense that they reflect a uniquely
accurate perspective has the effect of rendering every person's
beliefs and assumptions unassailable. The social observer who
takes social constructionist arguments seriously will have little
incentive to question his or her own beliefs. Indeed, the social
constructionist observer has a major disincentive to question
his or her own beliefs, since such questioning can be viewed as
an attempt to distance the observer from the observer's own
circumstances and therefore represents an exercise of bad
faith.6 This self-confirming subjectivism makes critique of any
kind impossible (since every social perspective is as a matter of
theory "true" to its own social origins), and thus leads to the
pessimistic conclusion that all "truth" is a function of power.
This conclusion leads, in turn, to an ideological battle to the
death for the right to enshrine one group's "truth" as
preeminent over every other group's "truth"-hardly a recipe
for progressive governance of a pluralistic culture.
In contrast to social constructionism, rationalist liberal
approaches to social organization are based on the assumption
that collective value judgments cannot be entirely selfreferential. Rationalist approaches also assume that even the
most carefully thought-out human framework can only
imperfectly control and regulate the larger objective reality in
which human societies operate. A system of social, political,
and legal norms that aspires to rationality and objectivityhowever imperfectly realized-thereby acknowledges its own
fallibility. Such a system acknowledges that the system will
eventually abandon or significantly recast some of its most
treasured tenets if further analysis reveals that some aspect of
the system no longer accurately reflects or responds to our
changing perceptions of what is valid, important, and-in a
factual sense-true.

6. See, for example, Catharine MacKinnon's attack on feminist lawyers
who disagree with her proposals to impose civil sanctions on pornography.
She attributes what she perceives to be their bad faith in part to the fact that
they have been inculcated in liberal values by their legal education. "What
law school does for you is this: it tells you that to become a lawyer means to
forget your feelings, forget your community, most of all, if you are a woman,
forget your experience." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 205 (1987).
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Social constructionists correctly point out that claims of
rationality and objectivity in social, political, and legal analysis
But the claims
are often a pretense for self-interest.
themselves are important because they implicitly acknowledge
the vulnerability of all assertions about truth and the
possibility-indeed, the inevitability-that the status quo will
always be subject to critique on the basis of evidence that
cannot be controlled or contained within the system. If new
evidence or further experience undermines the factual basis for
the normative assumptions on which the system is based, then
a social theory premised on objective analysis will dictate that
the flawed part of the system must be altered or abandoned.
All such systems therefore carry within them the seeds of their
own ideological destruction because rationalist analysis
operates on the assumption that every existing belief system is
unstable and imperfect and will eventually be superceded by
another, more rational set of social principles.
The same assumptions of instability and inevitable change
cannot be found in social constructionist theories. Whereas
rationalist social systems are inherently fluid and ideologically
unstable (because they are constantly subject to critique based
on the need to accommodate external facts and logical
inconsistencies), the postmodern social constructionist system
is leaden and intransigent. According to the social constructionist view, no perspective is inherently superior to any other,
and even the most eccentric perspective on reality may
legitimately be embraced even if it flies in the face of both logic
and evident facts.7 Subjective certainty is the key factor in
defining values within a social constructionist system, and if
certainty can be maintained, any set of values is impregnable
to challenge or change. For all their pretensions to social
progressivism, therefore, the social constructionist world is
conservative in the most basic sense-i.e., in the sense that
values are contained within a closed system of subjective
beliefs that are completely insulated from contrary evidence
and hostile critique.
Social constructionist theory assumes that dominant social
values are the product of little more than the will to power, and
therefore even the most idiosyncratic set of values can define

7. The social constructionists' defense of Tawana Brawley's "story"
despite its factual falsehood is the most obvious example of this tendency. See
infra note 12.
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the world indefinitely if its proponents remain resolute. Social
constructionists are therefore logically incapable of mustering
any real challenge to the structure of existing social hierarchies, nor can they present consistent proposals to mitigate
the ideological distortions of political power relationships.
Social constructionists can only search for ways to elevate their
own groups in the social hierarchy, so that their own favored
perspectives can define society in their own image. This
unending battle over the power to interpret the world (from
which follows the power to construct the citizenry) defines the
essentially fatalistic and pessimistic political view of social
constructionist theories-a political view that is perhaps the
single most important characteristic of political conservatism.
Social constructionists replace the liberal aspiration to
rationality and objectivity with the bald assertion of blind faith
in what is subjectively perceived. By deriding the value (or
even the possibility) of objective analysis, value-neutral
empirical investigation, and logical proof, the social
constructionists finally rely on a religious epistemology,
according to which truth is an entirely subjective phenomenon
that is derived exclusively from each observer's personal
connection with a reality that nonadherents cannot access. It
is not coincidental that the social constructionist approach to
reality proposed by theorists of the critical race/feminist/
postmodernist schools on the political left has also been used to
defend the theory of creationism, a sectarian substitute for
scientific analysis advanced by members of the religious and
political right.8
It is easy to see why individual believers find this religious
epistemology appealing. Belief in a prescribed reality situates
the believer in the world, and provides a level of psychological
stability and comfort that is difficult to forgo. In contrast,
rationalism and empiricism are comparatively disconcerting
because they challenge deeply-held faith, destabilize the
believer's world, and generate existential doubt about the
believer's intrinsic value and place in the universe. Social
constructionist true believers respond to the destabilizing
threat of Enlightenment modes of thought in the same way as
their religious brethren respond to the threat posed by science.
William Jennings Bryan responded to the threat posed by

8. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to
Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671 (1992); Fish, supranote 4.
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science by suggesting that "[it would be better to destroy every
other book ever written, and save just the first three verses of
Genesis."9 The progressive social constructionists respond in
similar fashion by seeking to remove protection from speech
that challenges their own preferred view of reality.0
The adoption of a religious epistemology permits social
constructionist theorists of the secular left as well as the
religious right to deny not only social facts, but also what the
philosopher John Searle calls "brute facts."" Social facts
impute meaning to objects or practices that would otherwise
remain meaningless (such as the way in which society ascribes
meaning to a dollar bill or a red light at an intersection), while
"brute facts" exist independent of human intentions. The
existence of the planet Jupiter is a brute fact, and so are the
many mundane and often harsh facts of the world that form
the raw material out of which society shapes its values and
recognizes its limits. Social and legal policy must take account
of brute facts because these brute facts bracket and limit the
possibilities of human activity. Social constructionists deny
this reality by focusing on their own subjective reaction to the
world, which permits them to devise and defend policies even
when the factual basis for those policies is dubious or even
demonstrably untrue.12

9. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALIsM IN AMERICAN LIFE
125 (1963).

10. Catharine MacKinnon has argued, for example, that the equality
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment should be used to prohibit
"expressive means of practicing inequality." CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
ONLY WORDS 107 (1993).
Thus, she argues for the removal of First
Amendment protection of pornography and hate speech, and asserts that in
an educational setting it would be harassment to expose students to false
ideas, including "academic books purporting to document women's biological
inferiority to men, or arguing that slavery of Africans should return, or that
Fourteenth Amendment equality should be repealed, or that reports of rape
are routinely fabricated." Id
11. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 27 (1995).
12. One example of the social constructionist tendency to persist in
defending "stories" that turn out to be untrue is Patricia Williams' insistence
that Tawana Brawley was the victim of "some unspeakable crime. No matter
how she got there. No matter who did it to her-and even if she did it to
herself." PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 169-70
(1991). (Brawley claimed that she had been kidnapped, raped, and mutilated,
but evidence indicated that the kidnap and rape did not occur and the
mutilation was self-inflicted. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 95-117.)
The social constructionist insistence on privileging "stories" over facts has
problematic consequences in developing public policy. Similar attitudes have
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Radical subjectivism may be defensible as an aesthetic or
literary approach in an area where the meanings of texts and
images can be subject to endless (and relatively harmless)
dispute. But the refusal to recognize a reality independent of
tendentious subjective perception becomes much more
dangerous when it is combined with the allocation of authority
in a society where a small group of political actors will exert
ultimate power over all those within a particular jurisdiction.
Social constructionist theory has no apparent method by which
to limit the exercise of political power by dominant members of
society. Having abandoned truth, all the social constructionists
have left is power. The implications of this substitution of
power for truth are the subject of the next section, but in
passing it is worth noting again how odd it is that a supposedly
progressive analysis articulated on behalf of disadvantaged
groups generates a theory that would remove virtually all
structural restrictions on the unrestrained exercise of the very
thing that these groups lack-i.e., political power.
II. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND THE
SUBSTITUTION OF POWER FOR TRUTH
When social constructionists renounce the possibility of
ascertaining an objective reality that is external to the
individual observer, they effectively provide the dominant
social observer with absolute authority to define reality and
mould it to the observer's will.
Insofar as the social
constructionists would abandon a constitution'al regime that
incorporates a liberal Holmesian skepticism about officially
mandated orthodoxies,1 3 the dominant observer would also be
contributed to the rush to adopt legislation that criminalizes a vaguely
defined category of "hate crimes" despite a lack of hard evidence to back up
claims that such crimes are rapidly increasing, the absence of strong
arguments to suggest that existing, generic criminal laws inadequately punish
hate crime perpetrators, and the potential conflict between such statutes and
defendants' constitutional rights. For a critical discussion of the first two
points, see JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL
LAW & IDENTITY POLITICS (1998). For a discussion of the third point, see
Steven G. Gey, What if Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther
King, Jr.? The ConstitutionalFlaws of Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1014 (1997).
13. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[Wihen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the

1999]

WHYRUBBISH MATTERS

1717

permitted to define the social reality for everyone else in
society. The paradox is that the subjectivist epistemology of
social constructionism contradicts most of their critique of
liberal Enlightenment approaches to law and social policy.
The social constructionist challenge to liberal legal theory
is based on a rejection of the liberal claim that a system of
constitutionally limited government permits many divergent
modes of thought to peacefully coexist without forcing any
group to renounce its most basic beliefs in order to participate
in democratic self-governance.
The social constructionists
challenge this assumption on the grounds that by creating such
a system, liberals surreptitiously undermine alternative
ideologies by forcing these liberal challengers to fight the battle
over social norms on hostile liberal terms. Thus, liberals
supposedly undermine traditional religious views by imposing
on public debates the liberal assumptions of fallibilism and
pluralism, 14 devalue the perspective of gender dissidents by
requiring debates over social policy to be conducted in a logical
framework using empirical analysis,15 and perpetuate
discrimination against racial minorities by protecting the
rights of those who verbally express racial hatred. 6 The theme
underlying all these critiques is that liberalism is insufficiently
cognizant of cultural diversity, hence Farber and Sherry's use
of the term "radical multiculturalists" to describe liberalism's
critics.17
The fatal flaw of the multicultural/social constructionist
critique is that abandoning liberal political processes in favor
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at
any rate is the theory of our Constitution.").
14. See Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds
Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2331 (1997). According
to Fish, the assumptions of fallibilism (i.e, the view that "all our views are
partial and therefore challengeable") and pluralism (i.e., the view that "the
more points of view in play the better") marginalize those who adhere to
absolutist religious faiths, and therefore "mandate that liberalism wins." Id.
15. See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 54 ("If feminism is a critique of the
objective standpoint as male, then we also disavow standard scientific norms
as the adequacy criteria for our theory, because the objective standpoint we
criticize is the posture of science.").
16. See Charles R. Lawrence, I, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444 ("[A]ll racist speech
constructs the social reality that constrains the liberty of non-whites because
of their race.").
17. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 5.
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of unmediated social constructionism would produce a political
and legal structure that would be more, not less, likely to
disparage, devalue, and discriminate against groups that are
not part of the controlling power structure that defines
society's dominant ideology. Unless social constructionists
have discovered a heretofore hidden route to a social utopia in
which society will be based on total equality among groups and
no group will possess more political power than any other, they
must acknowledge that even in a social constructionist state
some groups will be more powerful than others. Thus, the
social constructionist alternative to liberal constitutionalism
will face the same problem of ideological domination that the
critics find objectionable in the current regime. The only
difference is that the group at the top of a social constructionist
power structure will have absorbed the social constructionist
"truth" that reality is whatever that group subjectively
perceives it to be, an epistemologically arrogant attitude that
can be expected to replicate itself in the powerful group's
exercise of power.
The arrogance of power that is built into the social
constructionist system can be seen in the social constructionist
attacks on First Amendment protections of expressive and
religious freedom. Social constructionists relentlessly disparage
the notion that courts should protect the speech of those with
whom the constructionists disagree.18 Stanley Fish has applied
a similar analysis in arguing against Establishment Clause
restrictions on the infusion of religion into government. 19 The
same corrosive logic would presumably apply to the other parts

18. Some of the most prominent examples of this literature include
Lawrence, supra note 16 (supporting restrictions on hate speech); Mari J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideringthe Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989) (same); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful
Speech, Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of"A Just Balance" ChangesSo
Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851 (1994) (same); MACKINNON, supra note 10
(supporting restriction of pornography, hate speech, and various other verbal
attacks on equality principles); STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As
FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too 104 (1994) (arguing against the

principle ofjudicially protected free speech on the ground that "[slpeech... is
never a value in and of itself but is always produced within the precincts of
some assumed conception of the good to which it must yield in the event of
conflict").
19. See Fish, supra note 14 (arguing against Establishment Clause
protections against religious involvement with the state); Fish, supra note 4
(criticizing liberal premises of Establishment Clause doctrine that prohibits
the advocacy of religious doctrine in public schools).
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of the Bill of Rights as well, including Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment protections against excessive applications
of the government's power to enforce the law against those who
violate society's norms. All of these protections are based on
the same liberal Enlightenment notion that individuals should
be protected from the excesses that inevitably result from the
collective exercise of power.
The social constructionist bottom line is that no
constitutional system can avoid the Hobbesian reality that raw
politics ultimately defines social values, and that politics is
nothing less than the battle between subjective absolutes
whose proponents have little reason to respect the competing
absolutes of their ideological adversaries.20
For all their
paeans to multicultural relativism, social constructionists are
actually absolutists in the end because they cannot devise a
consistent theory to prevent one socially constructed group
from permanently establishing its subjective reality as the
defining ideology of a society it controls. Since the social
constructionists must acknowledge that many groups will
define their subjective perspective on society in terms of moral
and political absolutes, the social constructionists willingly
open the door to the imposition of such absolutes on everyone
in society-including those who have arrived at a very different
subjective approach to the world, but who lack the political
power to prevail in the competition for social dominance.
Social constructionists cannot escape this trap by establishing
structural safeguards to prevent a power grab by one group

20. There are several parallels between the social constructionist and
Hobbesian views of humanity. Like Hobbes, the social constructionists believe
that humans derive their notions of right and justice from the habits and
customs of their social upbringing. Thus, "like little children, [they] have no
other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from
their Parents, and Masters." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 52 (Everyman ed.
1983). Also like Hobbes, the social constructionists view reason as a largely
pragmatic and dispensable attribute, since humans, "grown strong and
stubborn... appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as
it serves their turn; receding from custome when their interest requires it,
and setting themselves against reason as often as reason is against them." Id.
The social constructionists and Hobbes both view truth as an instrumental
phenomenon, in that "men care not, in that subject what be truth, as a thing
that crosses no man's ambition, profit, or lust." Id. at 52-53. And finally, both
the social constructionists and Hobbes see in the competing visions of reality
among different individuals and groups "a general inclination of all mankind,
a perpetual and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in
Death." Id at 49.
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because to do so would lead social constructionists back to
precisely the sort of liberal constitutional protection against
political absolutism that the social constructionists have
labored for so long to escape.
The absolutist trap into which social constructionists
inevitably fall can be traced to the contradictory impulses
evident throughout the social constructionist literature. As
noted above, social constructionists routinely attack the use of
syllogistic logic, rationality, and objective analysis of social
problems, and propose instead that social policy should be
developed through the telling of "stories" and other emotive
descriptions of subjective perceptions of reality. Like many
other aspects of social constructionism, this attack on rational
discourse has its roots in recent French intellectual fashions,
especially Jean-Francois Lyotard's endorsement of "narrative
knowledge," which "certifies itself in the pragmatics of its own
transmission without having recourse to argumentation and
proof."2!
Like their French counterparts, however, the social
constructionists cannot escape playing the game that they
insist cannot be played. Social constructionist "stories" are
supposed to convey a sense of a separate reality apart from the
empirical world of objective liberal policy analysis, but the
"stories" are really used to support the much more mundane
claim that liberalism fails to live up to its promises. The social
constructionists may rely on emotion and subjective blind faith
to support their claims against liberalism, but their underlying
message is barely distinguishable from a standard rationalist
critique. When the social constructionists claim that their
opponents have ignored or misjudged facts, or have relied upon
sloppy logic and flawed reasoning, the social constructionists
implicitly concede that there is maybe something to rational
liberal social analysis after all.22 The stories are not that
21. JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT

ON KNOWLEDGE 27 (1984).

22. The very fact that the social constructionists take the time to critique
liberal legal theory in such detail probably dictates that their critique will
ultimately take the form of the very doctrine they reject. To the extent that
the social constructionists are not just talking to themselves, but are actually
trying to win the debate over liberalism and implement their policy goals,
they must cast their arguments about the failures of liberalism in a form that
is accessible to the ideological adversaries they are trying to convert.
Unfortunately, this effort to articulate mutually accessible reasons for the
failure of liberalism probably undermines their claims that all critique is
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different in content from the fodder of standard empirical
analysis, except that they are cast in a form that makes it
impossible to measure their accuracy or ensure their typicality.
The social constructionists' dense theoretical discussions and
wrenching descriptions of personal experience are just window
dressing for some very traditional policy arguments over the
meaning of equality, justice, and freedom, which in turn form
the basis of arguments about the nature of democratic
legitimacy. The social constructionist discussions of these
issues are more overtly political than those of their opponents,
but it is an ethereal, multisyllabic, ivy-tower kind of politicspolitics as parlor game.
If the social constructionists were serious about addressing
the deep and irreconcilable conflicts between Enlightenment
liberal and postmodern illiberal narratives, they would not
confine their activities to writing articles in law reviews
chronicling the failings of liberal legal analysis. The present
legal system is so intertwined with Enlightenment modes of
knowledge and ways of thinking that a truly radical critique
would insist on abandoning the system altogether, perhaps in
favor of some radically subjective, impressionistic model of
justice along the lines of the late-nineteenth century French
experiment known as le phgnomne Magnaud.23 But social
subjective and exclusive to each separately situated social observer. Jurgen
Habermas once made a similar point about Richard Rorty's social
constructionist-style suggestion that validity claims are not meaningful
outside the very subjective circumstances of those who live the reality of those
claims. Habermas argues instead for the possibility of "a validity claim that
points beyond the provincial agreements of the specific local context," based
on shared understandings of what constitutes rationally superior arguments.
Jiirgen Habermas, Questions and Counterquestions, in HABERMAS AND
MODERNITY 192, 194 (Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1985). He goes on to point out
that the debate over legitimacy assumes an underlying rationality that is
necessary for communication about any problem to take place.
Any mutual understanding produced in communication and
reproduced in the life-world is based on a potential reserve of reasons
that may be challenged, reasons that force us to take a rationally
motivated position of yes or no.... From the perspective of the
participant, a moment of unconditionedness is built into the
conditions of action oriented toward reaching understanding. From
the perspective of the first person, the question of which beliefs are
justified is a question of which beliefs are based on good reasons; it is
not a function of life-habits that enjoy social currency in some places
and not in others.
Id. at 194-95.
23. Benjamin Cardozo used this short-lived revolt against formal French
jurisprudence as an example of a movement "to make the individual sense of
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constructionists are upper-middle class academics, not true
radicals. They do not (as did the true radicals of the Paris
Commune, the nineteenth century utopian socialists, or even
the Wobblies) seek to exterminate all vestiges of existing social
and political structures in favor of formulating new and unique
modes of social life. Instead, the various groups that coalesce
around the concept of social constructionism act like
traditional interest groups in seeking a bigger share of the pie
for each group's benefit. The structural changes they propose
are merely ways of tilting the system in their favor. In
contrast to true radicals, the social constructionists do not
want to overthrow the old regime; they simply want to put
their own man or woman on the throne. Their policy objectives
are then reduced to arguments about removing systematic
restrictions on their chosen ruler's ability to enforce their own
policy preferences.
This last point is critical, because it undermines the basic
thrust of the social constructionist attack on liberalism. The
social constructionists purport to reject what Lyotard calls
"metanarratives'-i.e., rational frameworks devised to
categorize, systematize, and thereby understand the messy
facts that make up social reality. But in reality the social
constructionists simply want to replace the dominant liberal
metanarrative-which incorporates concepts of dispersed
political power, protection for individual rights, and constitutional limits on government excesses-with a metanarrative
of their own that imposes far fewer limitations on the exercise
of political power in the interests of the favored groups. 24 This

justice in law as well as in morals the sole criterion of right and wrong."
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 138 (1921).
The members of this movement were known as les bons juges (the good
judges), and [t]hey seem[ed] to have asked themselves in every instance what
in the circumstances before them a good man would wish to do, and to have
rendered judgment accordingly," even in the face of inconsistent statutes. Idat 139.
24. To the extent that the various ideological groups discussed in Farber
and Sherry's book have competing interests, there may be differences in the
details of the metanarratives favored by, for example, critical race theorists
and feminists. But each of these groups share basic assumptions about social
analysis: they each adhere to the principles of social constructionism, reject
the publiclprivate distinction, and would abandon constitutional protections of
individual rights when necessary to pursue an agenda based on
interpretations of equality that would favor their groups. See Steven G. Gey,
The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 193
(1996) (describing each of these elements in critical race and feminist theory
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brings the discussion back to the issue posed at the beginning
of this essay: Is the metanarrative implicitly supported by
social constructionists more or less politically progressive than
the liberal metanarrative that they consistently oppose? The
next section briefly sketches an answer to that question.
El. RATIONALISM, UNIVERSALISM, AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS
It is my contention that the social constructionist theories
addressed in Farber and Sherry's book Beyond All Reason tend
to support a deeply conservative politics, despite the overt
political progressivism of most social constructionist theorists.
Moreover, it is my contention that these theories are
incompatible with any seriously progressive critique of the
established order, and are probably also inconsistent with the
basic conception of democracy itself. I recognize that these are
weighty charges. The full defense of these arguments would
require much more space than is presently available, but the
broad outlines of this critique can be set forth briefly.
As an initial matter, terms such as "progressive,"
"conservative," and even "democracy" are the subjects of great
dispute within legal and political theory, but I am using these
terms in the broadest possible sense, to denote basic elements
that would be part of any reasonable definition of these
concepts. Thus, as noted in the introduction to this essay, the
term "conservative" is used here to denote skepticism about
popular rule, resistance to social change, and deference to the
relatively unfettered exercise of political authority. Conversely, the term "progressive is used to identify any theory that
views the persistence of any given political and economic
hierarchy as problematic. A "progressive" political or legal
theory therefore seeks to broaden access to political power for
traditionally excluded individuals and groups, limit the
approaches to First Amendment protections of free speech). The differences
in detail between the metanarratives favored by the different groups are
therefore secondary to the similarities in the broad outline of the world view
that the social constructionist metanarrative reflects. For a description of
conflicting liberal and social constructionist metanarratives in the social
constructionist literature, see Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 346-47 (1991)
(contrasting the traditional First Amendment narrative, which emphasizes
intellectual freedom from "superstition and enforced ignorance," with an
alternative "minority-protection" narrative that focuses on issues of civil
rights and racial discrimination).
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arbitrary use of political power by any dominant faction in a
manner that skews the system permanently in favor of that
faction, and eliminate barriers preventing individuals or
groups from obtaining power based on previous conditions of
poverty or social exclusion. Finally, the term "democracy" is
used to denote theories emphasizing the importance of popular
consent to the allocation and exercise of political power. As
used here, the term "democracy" can encompass very different
mechanisms of communicating popular consent to governance,
including both indirect representation and direct citizen
participation. In all its manifestations, however, the term
"democracy" incorporates the belief that popular consent is
fluid, and power relationships are temporary and subject to
change. Thus, a democratic political system must include some
internal safeguards to ensure that a powerful faction does not
use its presumptively temporary dominance to capture
permanent control of the government.
Even if the relevant terms are used in this broad and least
controversial manner, social constructionism's essentially
conservative and even anti-democratic nature is evident. The
doctrine's political failure stems from the core assertion of
social constructionist theory that "truth" is entirely a
subjective matter, which turns on the observer's perception and
emotional reaction to reality rather than on the accuracy and
rationality of the observer's description of and reaction to an
objective reality that exists apart from the observer. The
emphasis on the singularity of each observer's emotional
reactions to the world means that social constructionists must
reject the univeralism and rationalism that characterizes
modern liberal theory. They reject universalism because no
person can communicate effectively that person's separate
reality to another person who is "constructed" by a significantly
different ethnicity and personal background. They reject
rationalism because it imposes an oppressive structure on
descriptions of reality that denies the subjective "truths" of
individually situated observers. Yet by rejecting universalism
and rationalism, social constructionists effectively abandon the
two most critical tools of progressive politics.
To explain why this is so, it is necessary to define
"universalism" and describe why universalism and rationalism
are key components of truly progressive political and legal
theory. The concept of "universalism" combines two complementary requirements of a progressive political theory: first,
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the need to render universal abstract judgments that separate
legitimate from illegitimate political outcomes, and second, the
need to express in general terms common human responses to
oppressive behavior.
With regard to the first requirement of universalism, a
progressive political theory requires a comprehensive vocabulary of political critique, so that oppressive conduct can be
distinguished from routine conflicts among political equals. To
use examples drawn from recent European politics: the
electoral defeat of the German Christian Democrats by the
Social DemocratlGreen Party coalition cannot be described as
oppressive, but this term arguably could be applied to the
previous German government's efforts to limit the citizenship
and political participation of Germany's growing immigrant
population. 25 Some political battles that have winners and
losers are different from others, and a valid progressive
political theory needs to take account of that fact. If the social
constructionists are correct in asserting that all political values
are based in the particular circumstances of each political
group and therefore cannot be abstracted into a set of general
political principles, there can be no universal political
vocabulary to distinguish legitimate political battles from a
dominant group's illegitimate subordination of defenseless
political opponents. A progressive critique of injustice therefore becomes impossible. All politic conflict is reduced to a
battle between interest groups, and Nazis and Jews are thereby placed on the same moral plane.
The second respect in which universalism is necessary to a
valid progressive political theory is as a reflection of common
cross-cultural human responses to oppression. The point here
is that every individual, regardless of background or political
inclination, is likely to respond in the same way to certain
kinds of arbitrary, oppressive political acts. Political principles
should be able to represent in the abstract the typical human
response to being harassed on the street (or arrested, or
beaten) without cause by a policeman. (Or being arrested for
speech that the state finds distasteful, or being fined for worshipping the wrong deity, or being convicted of a crime without
25. See Alan Cowell, Like It or Not, Germany Becomes a Melting Pot, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at A3 (describing the Kohl government's refusal to

change a restrictive 1913 German immigration law). The new government
has proposed liberalizing the 1913 law. See 2 German PartiesReach Deal To
Relax Law on Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at AS.
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a fair trial.) These universal human responses to tyrannical
behavior are the basis of a comprehensive set of limits on all
governments and political factions-even those that identify
themselves as politically progressive.
In contrast to the stance of the traditional left, the cultural
left represented by the social constructionists has abandoned
the effort to articulate a universal response to oppressive
governmental behavior that occurs in every culture sooner or
later. By abandoning this effort, the social constructionists
also abandon any attempt to address the common fears and
travails that link all powerless people. Even worse, they also
implicitly accept the possibility that some oppressive acts can
be justified by other social interests that the state has decided
to endorse. The abandonment of universal principles that limit
the exercise of political power does not automatically lead to a
latter-day Stalinist state, but even lesser oppressions should be
incompatible with a comprehensively progressive political
theory. Once the set of universal limitations on the exercise of
power is subordinated to the short-term policies of a zealous
government, 26 excesses and abuses cannot be far behind. And
the slope is indeed slippery; it is a very short step from
mocking the right to free speech (a favorite target of social
constructionists) to slighting the rights to a fair trial, freedom
from warrantless searches and self-incrimination, and
protection against cruel and unusual punishments. If one
individual liberty is a dispensable social construct, then so are
the others.
The universalism advocated here should be distinguished
from other, more comprehensive concepts that are sometimes
identified by the same term. For example, I am not advocating
(and indeed specifically reject) the much stronger variety of
universalism proposed by the civic republicans, who assert
their "commitment to universalism, or agreement as a
regulative ideal, [which] takes the form of a belief in the

26. See, for example, Stanley Fish's typically forthright statement of the
relationship between policies and principles: "[Tihe relationship between
policy desires and so called 'principles' is the reverse of what is usually
maintained. The desires come first and last, and the principles, appropriately
tailored, piece out the middle. The right way-no the only way-to proceed is
to figure out what you think should happen and then look around for
principles, First Amendment ones or any others, that will help you to get
there." Stanley Fish, Children and the First Amendment, 29 CoNN. L. REv.
883, 891 (1997).
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possibility of settling at least some normative disputes with
substantively right answers."2 7 Strong universalism of this
sort is problematic because it posits a set of essentialist social
norms that are unrealistic and unobtainable in any pluralistic
society. These norms come in the form of a uniform set of core
beliefs that civic republicans argue should define a democratic
society. "It is because of the belief in universalism that
republican approaches posit the existence of a common good, to
be found at the conclusion of a well-functioning deliberative
process." 28 These core beliefs are essentialist because they are
deemed normatively true-i.e., "better than others"29-and
may therefore be used to justify government action that
prevents the dissemination of "false" views by dissenters to the
Similar problems plague
dominant normative scheme.30
attempts to apply in the real world Jiirgen Habermas's theory
of communicative action, which he argues should produce a
series of social norms (legitimately enforceable as law) "to
which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants
in rational discourses."3 1
The version of universalism advocated here is significantly
less comprehensive than the strong universalism proposed by
the civic republicans and Habermas. In fact, these forms of
strong universalism share some unfortunate absolutist
tendencies with social constructionist theory. Although they
differ on the question of whether diverse constituencies can
ever reconcile their policy differences and reach a consensus,
both the strong universalists and social constructionists share
a belief in the concept of "substantively right answers," and
also share a belief that the identification and enforcement of
substantively right answers are a valid basis for a progressive
political theory.

27. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,
1541 (1988).
28. Id. at 1554.
29. "he belief in universalism affirms instead that some perspectives are
better than others, and that that claim can be vindicated through discussion
with those initially skeptical." Id. at 1574.
30. For a more comprehensive explanation of this critique, see Steven G.
Gey, The UnfortunateRevival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 801
(1993).
31. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO
A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 107 (William Rehg trans.,
1996).

1728

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1707

The absolutism inherent in such theories undermines any
real possibility that a political theory with these traits could
avoid the ossification and corruption that always accompanies
the pursuit of final answers through the application of political
power. A political system that attempts to ascertain and
enforce a uniform set of "substantively right answers" will
achieve only, in Justice Jackson's nice phrase, "the unanimity
of the graveyard."32 A truly progressive politics can avoid the
inevitable corruption and tyranny of such a system only by
adhering to the sorts of weak universalist protections that
make ongoing social critique possible, and which are necessary
to keep the process of social evolution in motion.
Thus, as a logical matter, a proper progressive political
theory should include a recognition of what I have called
elsewhere "losers' principles"--i.e., principles that protect
political losers from the coercive mandates of political winners
forcing the losers to renunciate their moral and political
values. 33
The countermajoritarian protections scattered
throughout the Bill of Rights-including and perhaps especially the right of free speech-are specific examples of these
principles. The irony here is that weak universalism (i.e., the
protection of political and moral minorities through systematic
limitations on the application of political power) is the only
protection against the dangers of strong universalism (i.e., the
use of political power to discover and enforce a set of
"substantively correct answers" to collective and individual
normative concerns). The weak universalism represented by
losers principles suggests the possibility that ideological
enemies who will disagree fundamentally about ultimate goods
can nevertheless logically come to basic agreements about the
sorts of structural protections from the excessive use of power
that makes a long-term discussion of ultimate goods possible in
a pluralistic society.
The concept of losers' principles unites progressive political
theories with the most elementary requirements of democracy.
The politically progressive aspect of this approach simply
recognizes that losers' principles are likely to benefit the very
kinds of powerless and disenfranchised groups that have

32. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943).,
33. See Gey, supra note 30, at 879-97.
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always been the constituency of the left. 34 The democratic
aspect of this approach ensures that popular consent to the
government's power-the sine qua non of any legitimate
democratic state-remains viable over the long term by
protecting present-day minority political factions that may
become the political majority several generations hence. A
failure to incorporate weak universalist protections against the
excesses of power renders any putative democracy a sham
because in the absence of such protections for ideological
dissent any popular consent to political authority must be
viewed as coerced and therefore invalid.
The antidemocratic tendencies of social constructionist
theory can be traced to the dissonance at the heart of all
versions of this theory. On one hand social constructionist
theories are radically pluralistic in arguing that every group is
constructed in a unique way that separates it from every other
group. On the other hand, because they reject rationalism,
empirical analysis, and other external critiques of each group's
socially constructed perspective, social constructionists do not
adopt an attitude of theoretical relativism toward assertions of
truth. Instead, as noted above,35 social constructionists argue
that every group can adopt its own version of "truth," and each
version of "truth" is insulated against all critiques by
nonmembers of the group. In the end, social constructionists
are pluralistic absolutists, in that they explicitly give every
group the power to define truth for itself and, since the social
constructionists refuse to recognize the legitimacy of liberal

34. The fluid nature of power and powerlessness in a world where one
day's oppressed may turn into another day's oppressor probably accounts for
the skepticism with which members of the Old Left (or even the Old New Left)
have greeted postmodernist political theory's dismissal of the Enlightenment
metanarrative of human emancipation in favor of the smaller and ultimately
selfish goals of identity politics. See, e.g., Eric Hobsbawm, Identity Politics
and the Left, 217 NEW LEFT REVIEW 38, 43 (1996) (Let me state firmly what
should not need restating. The political project of the Left is universalist: it is
for all human beings. However we interpret the words, it isn't liberty for
shareholders or blacks, but for everybody.... And identity politics is
essentially not for everybody but for the members of a specific group only.");
TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY AMERICA IS
WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS 165 (1995) ("[What is a Left if it is not,
plausibly at least, the voice of a whole people?... If there is no people, but
only peoples, there is no Left."). (Hobsbawm is a British historian with
longstanding socialist credentials and Gitlin is a former president of the
Students for a Democratic Society).
35. See supra note 4.
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institutional limits on political power, they implicitly give
every group that obtains ultimate power the authority to
impose that group's "truth" on everyone else.
Viewed in this light, it is not surprising that social
constructionists have little use for rationalism or empirical
analysis. Rationalism is the cornerstone of both progressive
politics and democratic theory because rationalism is the
enemy of all ideological tyrants operating under the authority
of some tendentious "truth" to skew the system in their favor.
This is not to say that rationalist political theories are
themselves immune from using the structure of rationalism as
a cloak for self-deception, self-interest, and even tyranny.
Theories that emphasize the centrality of rationalist discursive
politics, such as civic republicanism and Habermas's theory of
communicative action, are potentially just as oppressive as
systems that operate on subjectivist faith.
Like the social constructionists, I am skeptical of claims
that rational discussion of basic social values (such as "virtue,"
"good," or "evil") or value-laden specific issues (such as the
permissibility of abortion or the legitimacy of the death
penalty) can produce a consensus about such concepts or issues
that can be justified by reference to the pristinely syllogistic
discussions that lead to a presumptively correct conclusion.
Like the social constructionists, I am equally skeptical that the
participants in even the most concertedly rational process of
social decisionmaking will ultimately decide to adopt any set of
social values for entirely rational reasons. Decisions about
basic social values have their basis in the highly subjectiveand often irrational-individual desires, beliefs, hopes,
superstitions, and fears of the citizens who make up the
society.
Yet even if the process by which social values are adopted
is ultimately irrational, reason still serves a crucial function in
a democratic political order. Even if reason does not serve the
positive function of guiding the citizens of a democracy in
adopting a set of social, political, and legal values, reason is
still the most important negative element in critiquing
whatever collective values currently define the status quo.
Protecting the negative function of reason in social critique is
crucial if (as liberal theory assumes) every ruler exercises
power in a self-serving fashion, seeks to perpetuate the ruler's
hold on power, and inclines toward suppressing dissent and
opposition by whatever means the legal structure permits.
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Reason as a negative value is also crucial in checking every
ruler's natural tendency to color the public's perception of
reality in a way that presents the ruler's views as representing
the common good. Constitutionally limited political cultures
incorporate the role of negative reason to limit efforts to
manipulate public perceptions through the imperfect process of
governmental persuasion and subtle incentives to adopt the
party line.
Negative reason-that is, the use of reason, logic, and
empirical challenges to the representations of reality offered by
the political status quo-is crucial to keeping any powerful
political actor in line. Reason destabilizes tyrants because it
robs tyrants of the ability to deny the basis or consequences of
their actions. The social constructionists claim that "truth" is a
malleable, socially constructed, and therefore variable
phenomenon. This claim is viewed benignly only because the
social constructionists supposedly offer their theory on behalf
of groups that do not currently have the power to define society
in their own image.
But such a theory has ominous
implications in the hands of these (or any other) groups if they
ever obtained power.
If nothing exists except human
consciousness, and controlling reality depends on controlling
what people think about reality, then the primary goal of every
government will be to establish control over the minds of its
citizens.
In her essay on truth and politics, Hannah Arendt relates
a conversation between the French Premier George Clemenceau
and a representative of the Weimar Republic concerning the
issue of guilt over the outbreak of the First World War. "What,
in your opinion,' Clemenceau was asked, 'will future historians
think of this troublesome and controversial issue?' He replied,
This I don't know. But I know for certain that they will not
say Belgium invaded Germany."36 Arendt uses this as an
example of the "indestructibility" of "brutally elementary data,"
in the absence of "a power monopoly over the entire civilized
world."37 But Arendt then hesitates before rejecting the
possibility that such a power could exist:
[S]uch a power monopoly is far from being inconceivable, and it is not
difficult to imagine what the fate of factual truth would be if power
interests, national or social, had the last say in these matters. Which

36. ARENDT, supra note 4, at 239.
37. Id.

1732

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:1707

brings us back to our suspicion that it may be in the nature of the
political realm to be at war with truth in all its forms, and hence to
the question of why a commitment
to even factual truth is felt to be
38
an anti-political attitude.

A similar recognition may explain the social constructionist resistance to concepts of truth, rationality, and empirical
analysis of their favored political premises. The heart of the
social constructionist project is to politicize everything by
subordinating Enlightenment notions of truth and individual
freedom to postmodern conceptions of all-encompassing power
and the collective interest in "constructing" a compliant
citizenry. Maybe upon the successful completion of this project
we would all be better off for the effort: happier, less conflicted,
at one with our community, and less likely to resist wellintentioned efforts to mandate social rectitude. In such a world
there certainly would be fewer individualistic square pegs
resisting the appeal of society's round holes. But I suspect we
could achieve such a peaceful state of affairs only in the
manner that Orwell's Winston finds peace at the end of 1984that is, only through the revelation that everything is all right,
the struggle is finished, and we have finally won the victory
over ourselves. 39
CONCLUSION
The quotation that introduces Beyond All Reason notes the
importance of "nam[ing] rubbish as rubbish.40 This quote is
taken from Salman Rushdie, who can attest that the ethereal
academic debate over social constructionism, rationalism, and
principles of individual liberty have some very concrete
consequences in the outside world. Theory matters, and if
there is truth in the postmodernist axiom that the personal is
political, it is equally true that for people like Rushdie the
political is often dangerously personal.
Rushdie's problems resulted from his encounter with a
government hell-bent (so to speak) on constructing a world
around its own conservative Islamic ideology, and equally
insistent on renouncing the values of religious toleration and
artistic freedom that are two of the Enlightenment's more
noble achievements. The fact that social constructionists can

38. Id.
39. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 300 (1949).
40. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 1, at 3.
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have nothing useful to say to the Iranian government in
Rushdie's defense is a graphic example of how social
constructionists can never deliver on their promise to create a
more humane and progressive replacement for what is (in their
view) a bloodless and arid liberalism. There are two lessons
here for social constructionists: first, bloodlessness is not such
a bad thing when the alternative is bloodiness, and second, the
potential for bloodiness increases exponentially when political
actions are justified by the sort of political sanctimony that
social constructionism encourages.
I hasten to add that none of what has been said above is
intended to imply that social constructionists should be
censored or drummed out of the academy. Some of their work
(Stanley Fish's, for example) is as consistently thoughtprovoking and entertaining as it is consistently wrong-headed,
and even the worst examples of the social constructionist genre
serve John Stuart Mill's function of providing "the clearer
perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its
collision with error."41 In any event, the cache of social constructionism has probably already peaked, and it is safe to
predict that its proponents will soon be fending off the postpostmodernist theories of a new generation of radical young
scholars in search of promotion and tenure in the Oedipal
manner that the social constructionists have already perfected.
So as befits the tenor of a liberal constitutional scheme that is
still worth defending, the social constructionists can go right on
building their castles in the sky; they just should not be
allowed to make the rest of us live in them.

41. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974).

